The cleaning up of waste present in transboundary rivers, which requires the cooperation of different authorities, is a problematic issue, especially when responsibility for the discharge of the waste is not well-defined. Following Ni and Wang (2007) we assume that a river is a segment divided into several regions from upstream to downstream. We show that when the transfer rate of the waste is unknown, the clean-up cost vector provides useful information for estimating some limits in regard to the responsibility of each region. We propose a cost allocation rule, the Upstream Responsibility rule, which takes into account these limits in distributing costs "fairly" and we provide an axiomatic characterization of this rule via certain properties based on basic ideas concerning the responsibility of regions.
Introduction
Motivation The presence of waste in river channels is a major environmental problem faced by authorities since, on the one hand, waste can pollute water, which can be harmful for people, plants and animals, causing serious diseases and affecting ecosystems. As a consequence, the inhabitants of a region with more waste in its part of the river confront a cost: they consume lower quality water and/or face higher water depolluting costs. On the other hand, the presence of accumulated waste in a river is known to have a substantial effect on the probability of flooding when there is heavy rain, so it seems advisable to clean river channels regularly to reduce this danger. Around the world, about 200 rivers (see Sprumont, 2002 and Barrett, 1994 ) flow across national borders, and a much greater number across borders between regions or municipalities. All the activities for cleaning transboundary rivers may require cooperation on the part of the different authorities involved and coordination of efforts if they are to be effective. However, the distribution of the costs of these activities among the different regions may be a problematic issue, particularly when the extent to which each region is responsible for the waste discharged is not well-defined.
As far as we know, the first paper to analyze the problem of sharing the costs of cleaning a river among different regions from a theoretical point of view is that of Ni and Wang (2007) . They model a river as a segment which is divided into subsegments from upstream to downstream such that each region is located in one of them. They assume that there is a central agency that determines the cost of cleaning each of these segments and they axiomatically propose two methods for allocating the total cleaning costs among all regions along the river.
The first method, called Local Responsibility Sharing, establishes that the total cost that each region should pay is directly the cost of cleaning the segment in which this region is located. The second method, called Upstream Equal Sharing, states that the total cost that each region should pay is obtained by distributing equally the cost of cleaning each segment among the region in that segment and all the regions situated upstream from it. 1 We show that neither 1 These methods are based on the theories or principles of Absolute Territorial Sovereignty and Unlimited Territorial Integrity, respectively (see Godana, 1985 and Kilgour and Dinar, 1996) .
of these methods allocates the costs in a way that reflects the responsibility of each region in producing the waste present in river channels. The first does not take into consideration that the water of a river flows from one segment to another, taking part of the waste with it. The second implicitly assumes that the region in a segment and all the regions situated upstream from this have the same degree of responsibility for the waste present in the segment in question. However, this would only be "fair" if all regions have discharged exactly the same quantity of waste of the one present in that segment, which is not necessarily the case.
Overview of results
In this paper, we seek to develop an alternative rule to the methods proposed by Ni and Wang (2007) which takes into account the responsibility of the regions for the presence of the waste. We explicitly introduce into our model the fact that the waste is transferred, with the water, from upstream to downstream at a particular rate, an idea that is implicitly assumed in Ni and Wang (2007) . If the social planner knew this rate, she could use the cost vector to accurately calculate the amount of waste discharged by each region into the river, and the costs could thus be distributed according to their actual responsibilities. However, in practice, the transfer rate may be unknown. 2 In that case, we show that the social planner could estimate certain limits of that rate from the cost vector. Those limits provide useful information for distributing the costs fairly, since they enable certain limits of responsibility to be inferred for each region. We show that the rules that naturally adapt the methods proposed by Ni and Wang (2007) do not always assign costs in the intervals constructed with these limits, thus violating this basic principle of fairness.
We introduce a set of desirable properties taking into account this information concerning the responsibility of each region in discharging the waste. Those properties are: (i) Limits of Responsibility, which requires the cost paid by each region for cleaning its own segment always to be within its limits of responsibility; (ii) No Downstream Responsibility, which states that a region j situated downstream from another region i has no responsibility for the waste present in i and therefore does not have to pay anything towards the cost of cleaning it up;
(iii) Consistent Responsibility, which ensures that the part of the cost of cleaning a segment paid by one region relative to the part paid by another region is consistent throughout all the segments situated downstream from both regions;
and (iv) Monotonicity with respect to Information on the Transfer Rate, which states that when information on the transfer rate improves in such a way that it becomes natural to induce a higher (lower) estimated value for the real transfer rate, the amount of waste in any segment for which all its upstream regions are responsible must not be lower (higher) than before.
That set of properties characterize a new cost allocation rule, the Upstream Responsibility rule, which works as follows: first, it assigns to the region situated in a given segment the value of its responsibility taking as the transfer rate the mid-point in the interval between its lower and its higher limits. The remaining cost of cleaning the segment in question is divided among the upstream regions, maintaining the proportions of the allocation of the cost of cleaning the previous segment.
Related literature
The study of allocation problems using game theoretical and/or axiomatic models to solve issues related to transboundary rivers has developed in two directions. On the one hand (the harmful side) some authors have developed models for studying how to share the costs of cleaning a river among the regions located along it. On the other hand (the beneficial side) some papers have analyzed models for determining how to share water resources among the different regions along a river.
Among the papers dealing with the harmful side, which is the body of literature into which our paper fits, there are two main approaches. Remainder The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model, adapts the existing solutions of the literature to our framework and introduces a result that shows that the cost vector can provide useful information worth considering when constructing a cost allocation rule based on responsibility. Section 3 discusses some axioms for cost allocation rules reflecting basic ideas of responsibility, defines the Upstream Responsibility rule, provides a characterization of it based on the axioms defined previously and compares it with the other solutions. Section 4 contains several extensions of the basic model covering more complex situations and, finally, Section 5 concludes. The
Appendix contains the proofs of the results. 
The basic model Notation and definitions
Consider a river which is divided into n segments of the same size from upstream to downstream. There is a set of regions, each of which is located in one of the segments, which have discharged waste into the river. 4 This river has a transfer rate t that measures the proportion of waste that is transferred from one segment of the river to the next. This transfer rate may not be exactly known. Consider a general case in which the social planner knows that t is situated within an interval [t, t] , where t ∈ [0, 1) and t ∈ (0, 1]. 5 Cases in which t = t are situations in which the social planner knows the actual transfer rate, while the cases in which t = 0 and t = 1 are situations in which there is no information at all
There is a central agency that determines the cost of cleaning the river in each segment. We assume that this cost is exactly the amount of waste present in the segment in question. 6 The agency has to allocate the costs of the cleaning process to the different regions in a fair way. Our main objective is to find rules for allocating those costs in a way that reflects the responsibility of each region in the discharging of the waste. 4 To make the results clearer, we start in the basic model with the strong assumption that all segments are the same size. In Section 4 we explain how the results can be generalized to cover the cases in which the segments may be of different sizes. 5 We exclude from the basic analysis the extreme cases in which either t = 0 or t = 1.
Similarly, this basic model assumes a uniform transfer rate along the river. We explain in Section 4 how the results can be adapted when these assumptions are dropped. 6 This assumption is made for the sake of fluency. We could have assumed instead that the cost of cleaning each segment is an increasing linear function of the amount of waste present in it, without essentially altering the results. 7 A problem can also be defined by a triple (C, t, t) given that the information on N is included in C. However, we prefer to maintain both to be consistent with the notation used by Ni and Wang (2007) .
A cost allocation rule is a mapping x that assigns to each problem (N, C, t, t) a matrix of size n × n, (x there is no risk of confusion about the description of the problem, we will only write x j i (·). We will denote by x i (N, C, t, t) the total cost allocated to region i by the rule x in the problem (N, C, t, t); i.e.
concept to cost allocation problems that was proposed by Ni and Wang (2007) and also studied by van den Brink and van der Laan (2008) is a cost allocation method. This solution concept is a function x that assigns to each cost allocation problem (N, C, t, t) the vector (x i (N, C, t, t)) i∈N ∈ R n + ; i.e. the total cost that each region pays for cleaning the entire river. 
The LRS and UES rules
In this subsection we discuss the solutions proposed by Ni and Wang (2007 A cost allocation method is a less precise solution concept than a cost allocation rule given that the latter also makes it explicit how the total cost that each region pays to clean the entire river is attributed to each segment of the river (i.e. how each x i (·) is decomposed into x j i (·) for each j). We consider that a cost allocation rule is not only more informative but is also a better solution concept if the social planner decides to take into account the responsibility held by each region for the discharging of the waste present in each segment of the river. This is because a cost allocation rule explains explicitly how the cost of cleaning each segment has to be shared (i.e. how each c j is allocated 8 This condition is imposed in the studies of Ni and Wang (2007) and van den Brink and van der Laan (2008) as an axiom called Efficiency. We consider that this property should be included in the definition of a rule. 9 Notice that, as mentioned in the Introduction, these papers do not explicitly consider information about the transfer rate (t and t). However, we prefer to maintain it in the definition of their framework to highlight the main difference between the solution concepts.
to x j i (·) for each i). Note that each cost allocation method, andx andx in particular, corresponds to multiple cost allocation rules. It could be argued that this makes it hard to compare these solutions to those formulated in terms of cost allocation rules. Thus, it is convenient to determine a matching between each of those method and a particular rule. To that end, we adapt the set of axioms that characterize each method to the case of cost allocation rules and are able to isolate one particular rule for each particular method. We use the characterizations proposed by van den Brink and van der Laan (2008).
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The first axiom is No Blind Cost, which states that the total cost paid by a region in which there is no waste should be zero. We maintain this property invariant with respect to its original version.
No Blind Cost (NBC): For all problems (N, C, t, t) and all i ∈ N such that
The second property is Cost Symmetry, which states that region i and all its upstream regions should pay the same total cost if there is no waste in any segment upstream from i. We adapt the property to our framework by requiring not only that the total cost paid by each of these regions should be the same, but also its decomposition in terms of each segment.
Cost Symmetry (CS): For all problems (N, C, t, t) and all
The third and last property needed for these characterizations is Independence of Upstream Costs, which states that the total cost paid by a region should depend only on the waste present in its segment and in all the regions situated downstream from it. Similarly to CS, we also adapt this property to our framework by requiring not only that the total cost paid by each region be independent of the waste upstream from it, but also its decomposition in terms of each segment.
Independence of Upstream Costs (IUC): For all problems (N, C, t, t) and
We consider that these additional requirements in CS and IUC appropriately complement the original idea of the axioms when the solution concept adopted is a cost allocation rule.
Now we introduce two cost allocation rules that are particular extensions of the two methods proposed and studied by Ni and Wang (2007) and van den Brink and van der Laan (2008).
Definition 1 The Local Responsibility Sharing (LRS) rule, α, is given by
α j i (·) = { 0 if i ̸ = j c i if i = j.
Definition 2 The Upstream Equal Sharing (UES) rule, β, is given by
We show that these are the only cost allocation rules isolated by using the natural adaptations of the axioms that characterize the original methods.
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Proposition 1 A cost allocation rule satisfies NBC and IUC if and only if it is the Local Responsibility Sharing rule α.
Proposition 2 A cost allocation rule satisfies CS and IUC if and only if it is
the Upstream Equal Sharing rule β.
Limits of responsibility
We have assumed that the transfer rate t may be not totally known a priori by the social planner. However, there is some information that can be deduced 
Proposition 3 A valuet for the transfer rate is compatible with a cost allocation problem (N, C, t, t) if and only ift ∈ [t, t * (t, C)], where
t * (t, C) = min { min i∈{2,...n−1} { c i c i−1 } , c n c n−1 + c n , t } .
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This result allows us to reduce the uncertainty over the transfer rate. In particular, the cost vector C provides, jointly with t, a maximum limit for this rate that we denote t * (t, C). To see the capacity of this result, consider the following example. Given a problem (N, C, t, t), we will denote by l 
Example 1 Suppose a problem in which
N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, the cost vector is C = {10,
Proposition 4 Let (N, C, t, t) be a problem. Then,
It is natural to require that any rule that seeks to allocate costs in terms of each region's responsibility for producing the waste present in each segment should always respect the limits calculated in Proposition 4 when the costs are allocated. In the rest of this section, we discuss whether the LRS and UES rules fulfil this requirement.
On the one hand, the LRS rule meets the aforesaid requirement of responsibility only when t = 0. However, it can only be accepted as a rule that allocates costs taking responsibilities into account if the real transfer rate, t, is 0 in all rivers.
Nevertheless, this literature only makes sense when waste is transferred from one region to another, an idea that is realistic. On the other hand, the following example shows that, independently of the information about t (t and t), the UES rule does not satisfy the requirement of allocating costs within the intervals of responsibility defined in Proposition 4. 
Example 2 Consider the family of cost allocation problems
(N, C, t, t) such that N = {1,
The Upstream Responsibility Rule Axioms, definition and characterization
The axioms that we present for a rule are based on basic ideas about responsibility for the waste present in the river channel. The first axiom, Limits of Responsibility, seeks to avoid the problem found in the LRS and UES rules studied in the previous section. To that end, the property requires that the cost paid by each region for cleaning its own segment should always be within the limits calculated in Proposition 4.
Limits of Responsibility (LR): For all problems (N, C, t, t), and for all
The second axiom, No Downstream Responsibility, states that a region j located downstream from another region i has no responsibility for the waste present in i, and should therefore not pay any part of the cost of cleaning it up.
No Downstream Responsibility (NDR): For all problems (N, C, t, t) and all
To introduce the next property, Consistent Responsibility, assume three regions i, j and k such that i is located upstream from j and j upstream from k. A rule decides how the cost of cleaning the river in region j should be divided among all the regions depending on their responsibility for the waste present in this region. In particular, it establishes the responsibility of region i relative to the responsibility of region j for producing that waste
. Observe that part of the waste that has at some time entered j, which comprises the waste discharged by j and some of the waste discharged by the regions upstream from it including i, remains in j and part flowed on to j + 1. Given that regions i and j do not produce any waste other than that which arrived at some time at j, then the amount of waste that entered j + 1 from j must contain the same ratio of waste discharged by region i to waste discharged by region j as exists in the waste present in j. By a similar argument, that ratio must also be maintained in the amount of waste that remains in region j + 1 and did not flow on to j + 2.
Reasoning in the same way for the subsequent segments, it can be stated that this ratio must be maintained for any downstream segment k. Thus, the axiom states that the rule should establish the same degree of responsibility of region i relative to the responsibility of region j for the waste present in region k
as the relative responsibilities established for these regions in the waste present in j. For example, if region i is responsible for twice as much waste as region
, the axiom establishes that region i is also responsible for twice as much as region j in k
. In general, the axiom establishes
should be equal to
) .
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Consistent Responsibility (CR): For all problems (N, C, t, t) and all
The last property, Monotonicity with respect to Information on the Transfer
Rate, refers to situations in which, ceteris paribus, the information on the transfer rate improves. Given a problem (N, C, t, t), it is known from Proposition 3 that the transfer rate t is within the interval [t, t * (t, C)]. Assume that information on the transfer rate becomes more precise in such a way that some previous possible values of t can now be ruled out; that is, consider a new problem 14 The axiom is not expressed in terms of these quotients but in terms of products so as to avoid indeterminate forms.
If this informational improvement is such that the values discarded are mainly from the lower (higher) part of the interval [t, t * (t, C)], it would be natural to induce a not lower (not higher) estimated value for the real transfer rate. 15 Given that the cost vector is the same, the quantity of waste in any segment for which responsibility lies with all the upstream regions must be no lower (no higher) under the new estimation.
Therefore, the axiom requires that for any segment the total amount paid by all its upstream regions for cleaning the segment in question should now be no lower (no higher).
Monotonicity with respect to Information on the transfer rate (MIT):
For all problems (N, C, t, t) and (N,
and for all j ∈ N ,
t).
Observe that the above list of axioms includes, on the one hand, a basic principle 
Definition 3
The Upstream Responsibility rule, γ, is given by:
, c 0 is set to 0 and the indeterminate form 0 0 is set to 1.
The Upstream Responsibility rule is based on the responsibility of the agents involved in discharging waste into a river. In particular, if the social planner knows the actual transfer rate (t = t * (t, C) = t), it can be shown that this rule establishes that the total cost that each region has to pay to clean the entire river exactly matches the total quantity of waste that it has discharged, which can be deduced from the cost vector. To express it formally, we have that the quantity of waste discharged by a region i, that we denote by V i , can be deduced observing t and C. This amount of waste V i (t, C) is exactly the total cost that region i pays under the Upstream Responsibility rule. If, however, there is uncertainty over the transfer rate, the rule assigns to each region the total cost corresponding to the amount of waste that it is considered to have discharged, using s = t+t * (t,C) 2
as the estimated value of the transfer rate. That is, it assigns V i (s, C) to each region i. In other words, the cost allocation method corresponding to the Upstream Responsibility rule (which is uniquely determined and will be called the Upstream Responsibility method) assigns a distribution equal to the responsibility of each region, using s as the estimated transfer rate.
Proposition 5 Let (N, C, t, t) be a cost allocation problem. Then, the Upstream
Responsibility method Γ is
The following result states that the Upstream Responsibility rule is characterized by the combination of the four axioms introduced above.
Theorem 1 A rule satisfies LR, NDR, CR and MIT if and only if it is the
Upstream Responsibility rule γ.
We also show that this characterization is tight.
Proposition 6 Axioms LR, NDR, CR and MIT are independent.
A comparison with the LRS and UES solutions
In Section 2 we have constructed cost allocation rules that maintain the spirit of the LRS and UES methods. In order to avoid the problems detected in those rules, we have defined and characterized a new rule: the Upstream Responsibility rule. In this subsection, we discuss the differences between the three solutions. First, to illustrate how the three rules behave, we apply them to a particular cost allocation problem.
Example 3 Consider again the cost allocation problem defined in Example 1,
where N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, C = {10, 16, 8, 24}, t = 0, t = 1 and t * (t, C) = To discuss the differences between all these rules, we use their axiomatic decompositions. Consider first the new rule, γ. It is characterized by the combination of four properties: one based on the responsibilities inferred from the cost vector, LR, and three more basic properties (NDR, CR and MIT). As mentioned above, α and β satisfy all these properties except LR. Hence, the property LR is the source of the discrepancies between our proposal γ and the other two proposals, α and β. This is because LR compels us to consider the information that can be inferred from the cost vector about the responsibility of each region in producing the waste.
Another way to see this divergence between the rules is to focus on the characterizations of α and β. Remember that α is characterized by a combination of NBC and IUC, while β is characterized by IUC and CS. However, our rule only satisfies NBC. Again, this happens because the other two properties ignore the information that can be inferred from the cost vector about responsibilities. In particular, γ does not satisfy IUC because the estimated responsibility of region i for waste in the river is not totally independent of the waste present in the regions upstream from it: the waste in region i − 1 gives important information about the amount of waste that passed on to region i from its upstream regions and, therefore, γ takes it into account in estimating responsibilities. Similarly, γ does not satisfy CS because the responsibilities for the waste present in a segment are not symmetric across all its upstream regions: the cost vector gives information about these heterogeneous responsibilities that γ takes into account.
Besides comparing our cost allocation rule with the LRS and UES ones, we could compare their associated cost allocation methods directly. This analysis is important since, theoretically, it could happen that a cost allocation rule does not satisfy a particular property but its associated method does satisfy the adapted axiom for cost allocation methods. In the case of the Upstream
Responsibility method, we can analyze whether or not it satisfies the original axioms that characterize the LRS and UES methods. It can be seen that it satisfies the original NBC axiom, but it does not satisfy the original IUC and CS properties for the same reasons expressed in the previous paragraph, so the direct analysis of our method does not differ in this aspect from the analysis of the rule. Unfortunately, since there is no direct way of adapting our new axioms for cost allocation methods, we cannot evaluate any method, and in particular the LRS and UES ones, on the basis of these properties.
Extensions of the basic model and related problems
We have shown that given a transboundary river with waste transfer, the costs of cleaning each region provide information about the responsibility of each one for producing the waste which can be used to construct a new cost allocation rule. To infer this information, we have followed a simplified model that has enabled us to obtain results in a simple manner. Although such a model may seem too simple to be applied to real cost allocation problems, it is not difficult to extend it to more general situations. Some of those extensions are discussed below, with an explanation of how the axioms and results can be adapted.
We also include a subsection discussing an interesting dual problem to the one studied in this paper and how our results can be adapted to it.
16
Extensions on the definition of the segments
One of the assumptions of the basic model is that a river is divided into segments of the same size. A river with segments of different sizes could be posited to reflect the fact that regions can occupy different extensions along a river. We can analyze this more general case from our framework by associating a cost 16 We thank two anonymous referees for drawing our attention to some of these topics. 
Thus, using this strategy, we construct an associated problem (N * , C * , t, t) to (N, C, l, t, t). 17 Now, given that all segments in the problem (N * , C * , t, t) are of the same size, this associated problem is included in the domain of our basic model and, therefore, our results would imply the use of the γ rule to assign the costs. We can thus use this solution to define an assignment for the original problem by allocating to each region i ∈ N the sum of the costs allocated by γ to each of the segments in the associated problem:
t, t).
An interesting aspect of this extension that deserves more discussion is the 
Example 4 Consider the extended cost allocation problem (N, C, l, t, t) such
that N = {1, 2, 3}, C = {10, 16, 24}, l 2 = 2l 1 = 2l 3 , t = 0 and t = 
Extensions on the values of t and t
We have assumed t ∈ [0, 1) and t ∈ (0, 1] in our basic model, thus excluding the cases in which the social planner knows for certain that the actual transfer rate is 0 (t = 0) and those in which she knows that the actual transfer rate is 1 (t = 1). Although these are extreme cases without much practical relevance, the results of the basic model can also be applied to them after some details are considered.
Cases in which the social planner knows that there is no transfer of waste between two adjacent regions (t = 0) can be included in our basic model without changes, keeping the axioms and the characterization result invariant. Observe that in these extreme cases the Upstream Responsibility rule assigns the cost 18 Notice that Proposition 3 implies a maximum limit for t of 2 5 for both decompositions.
However, other decompositions might affect this maximum limit, biasing also the allocation selected. 19 More details on this extension can be provided upon request.
of cleaning each segment entirely to the region located there, thus coinciding in such cases with the LRS rule.
With respect to the cases in which the social planner knows that all the waste that enters a region is transferred to the next downstream region (t = 1), observe that they are compatible only with cost vectors C such that c i = 0 for all i < n. 20 In such cases no information can be deduced from the cost vector to infer responsibilities for the waste present in the last region, c n . Thus, sharing this cost equally among all regions could be a reasonable possibility.
Consider the extended domain that includes these extreme cases; that is, the domain of all cost allocation problems (N, C, t, t), where N = {1, . . . , n} ⊂ N,
Our characterization result can be extended to this extended domain by adding a new property to the axioms of Theorem 1.
This property is Weak Cost Symmetry, which applies the spirit of CS only to extreme cases in which there is total uncertainty about which region is responsible for each unit of waste. (N, C, 1, 1 ) and all j, k ∈ N such that c k = 0 for all k < n,
Weak Cost Symmetry (WCS): For all problems
The introduction of WCS implies that the rule must coincide with the UES rule for the extreme cases in which t = 1. The Upstream Responsibility rule can be therefore extended for this domain in the following way:
Definition 4 The Extended Upstream Responsibility rule, Γ, is given by
The general characterization can then be presented for this extension.
21 20 Note that these cost vectors are also compatible with other values of the transfer rate. 21 The proof is straightforward using Theorem 1 for all the natural cases, applying LR to the extreme cases of t = 0 (in which l i i (·) = l i i (·) = c i ) and applying WCS to the extreme cases in which t = 1. We therefore omit it.
Theorem 2 A rule satisfies LR, NDR, CR, MIT and WCS if and only if it is
the Extended Upstream Responsibility rule Γ.
Extension on the structure of the transfer rate
We have also assumed in the basic model that the transfer rate is uniform along the river. A possible extension of the model in regard to this assumption is to consider that the transfer rate changes in some areas of the river. This could be useful in modeling rivers that run through regions with different types of terrain, weather or biosystems. In such cases the model could be adapted by dividing the problem into subproblems with homogeneous characteristics. By applying Proposition 3 to each of them, different limits can be deduced for each particular transfer rate. Additionally, new limits can be deduced with the information of the entire river.
Below, we explain how the limits of each transfer rate must be calculated and, as a result, how the Upstream Responsibility rule is adapted in this extended model for a particular case.
Consider the cost allocation problems with five regions such that the terrain is homogeneous in the transitions from regions 1 to 3 and in the transitions from regions 3 to 5, but is different in these two parts. These problems can be formulated using two transfer rates: t, which measures the proportion of waste transferred from one segment to the next between segments 1 and 2 and between segments 2 and 3, and u, which does the same from segment 3 to 4 and from 4 to 5. Thus, the cost allocation problems are defined as (N t , N u , C, t, t, u, u) , where N t = {1, 2, 3} and N u = {3, 4, 5} specify between the segments to which each of the transfer rates (t and u, respectively) apply. In such cases, following arguments similar to those in Proposition 3, an upper limit for u is obtained with the same form as in the basic case:
The upper limit for t is also similar to that in the basic model, but here a new restriction can be established for it based on the information for region 3, where the two transfer rates interact:
The proof of all the arguments of this subsection follows a similar path to the proofs of the basic model and can be found in Appendix B (Supplementary Material).
where h(u) = c3 c3+c2· (1−u) .
Additionally, this new interaction enables a lower limit for u to be introduced:
Thus, in this extended model the results of Proposition 4 could be adapted according to the information about the transfer rates, adapting also axiom LR.
On the other hand, axioms NDR and CR need no adaptation in this context, while MIT has to be applied to the information on both transfer rates. As a result, the characterized rule for these problems uses the values s = t+t * (u,t,C) 2
to estimate the transfer rates t and u, respectively, and considers them in allocating costs in a way similar to that in the basic model:
s is used for transfers between segments upstream from 3 and v for transfers downstream from 3. The formal definition of the rule for the five player case is as follows: 
Extension on the information about the transfer rate
Another implicit assumption of the basic model is that the uncertainty of the social planner on the transfer rate takes the form of a symmetric random variable (for example, a uniform distribution) on the interval [t, t * (t, C)], so the mean value between t and t * (t, C) is always a good estimator of t. However, other distributions that are not symmetric may be assumed a priori and, axiom MIT would have to be reformulated to adapt our results to those cases. To be more precise, a modified version of MIT would have to be considered in which the changes in the intervals are evaluated on the basis not of their lengths but their masses of probability of the specific random variable assumed. As a result, the characterized rule would change to one in which the transfer rate considered in allocating costs is the expected value of the random variable. This process is explained below for the case of any arbitrary continuous variable.
Consider the cost allocation problems defined by 5−tuples (N, C, t, t, f (t)) such that the information of the social planner about t takes the form of a random variable with density function f (t) with support in [t, t * (t, C)]. In this extended model, axiom MIT is thus formulated as follows:
Monotonicity with respect to Information on the transfer rate (MIT):
For all problems (N, C, t, t, f (t)) and (N, C, u, u, g(u) 
23 and for all j ∈ N ,
where F is the cumulative distribution function corresponding to f .
Using this new general formulation of axiom MIT and maintaining the other axioms as in the basic model, the characterized rule is found to have exactly the same structure as in the basic case, except that the value of the parameter s in the formula of γ is equal to the expected value of t: s = ∫ t * (t,C)
A dual problem
We have studied a model in which there is already waste in a river and the clean-up costs have to be shared. However, there are situations in which certain identified polluters produce most of the residues and, in such cases, the social planner may be interested in implementing preventive policies to avoid subsequent problems. These policies may consist of giving such polluters incentives to reduce their levels of pollution. For instance, some public agencies have introduced contracts in which farmers commit to reducing their levels of pollution in return for a payment from the agencies (see also Barrett, 1994) .
, where F is the cumulative distribution function cor- The model studied in this paper so far assumes that polluting regions must be required to pay a cost for their activities, but this other framework implicitly assumes that they have the right to pollute the water and must be compensated for not doing so. As a result, the question of where the necessary funds should come from is dual to the question of who has to pay the clean-up costs in the other cases. Thus, in these cases, the social planner should allocate the costs of the incentive program to the regions situated downstream from the polluter, which will be the beneficiaries of the pollution abatement.
The dual problem can be defined starting with a polluted river, defined as in 
The interpretation of this rule for assigning the costs of the incentive program is also dual to the interpretation of the Upstream Responsibility rule. It assigns a total cost to each region equal to the amount of pollution that would be eliminated in that region if the polluter is paid to discharge less waste. In cases in which this amount cannot be precisely calculated because there is uncertainty over t, the rule uses the estimated transfer rate s = t+t * (t,C) 2 .
The reasoning behind the formal definition of the rule is simple. The proportion of waste discharged by region k that ends up in region i can be estimated using the Upstream Responsibility rule by quotient
. Thus, if the quantity discharged by k is reduced by z units thanks to the incentive, it is reasonable for region i to pay exactly that proportion of the program.
Concluding remarks
The presence of waste in rivers produces environmental problems and the costs of solving them may be quite high. In cases in which different municipalities, regions or even countries share a river, it is obvious that each region is not totally responsible for all the waste in its own segment, and it therefore seems desirable from a social point of view for these costs to be shared between all the regions responsible. This paper studies the possibility of constructing a rule for allocating those costs in line with the responsibilities of the regions for producing the waste. We have shown that the solutions previously proposed in the literature do not satisfy this objective because they fail to consider the information about the transfer rate that can be deduced from the cleaning cost 
Let V i be the amount of waste thrown into the water by region i. It is imme-
given that upstream regions may transfer waste to region i. In particular, the amount thrown into the water by region i is the difference between the total amount entered segment i and the amount transferred from its immediate upstream segment. Then, for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n},
However, for i = 1, since there is no upstream region,
Using expressions (1) and (2), we can obtain an expression of V i in terms of C and t:
Given that V i (t, C) is, by definition, non-negative and taking into account expression (3), the following conditions have to be satisfied: This is compatible with the concept of the river ending in a lake which belongs to a single region. If, however, the river ends in the sea, the model can be easily adapted by dropping this differentiation between regions.
Additionally, it is easy to see from the previous reasoning that any value oft between t and t * (t, C) is compatible with (N, C, t, t) . Then we have arrived at the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 4
Let (N, C, t, t) be a problem. First, take i = 1. Given that this region is the most upstream region in the river, it is straightforward that all the waste in this segment is of its own responsibility. Then, l 1−t , given that n is the most downstream region. Consider now the case in which t = 1. In this case, there is no information at all about how much of the waste is the responsibility of region n. Then, l n n (·) ∈ [0, c n ]. Finally, if t = 0, we have that all the waste present in region n is of its own responsibility and, thus, l n n (·) = c n . It is easy to see that all these expressions can be summarized as in the proposition. Then, the result is proved.
Proof of Proposition 5
In the proof of Proposition 3 (Equation (3)), we have shown that, knowing the transfer rate t and the cost vector C, we can deduce the amount of waste and c 0 is set to 0.
It is easy to see that φ satisfies LR, NDR and MIT. However, the following example shows that it does not satisfy CR. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, C = {10, 10, 5}, t = 0 and t = 1 be a cost allocation problem. We have that φ N, C, t, t) .
